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Article

Advancing Student Achievement Through
Elementary and Secondary Education Act
Waivers
Justin Lam∗
INTRODUCTION

To test, or not to test: that was the question that rankled Illinois
school district leaders, advocates, and members of the State Board of
Education during a November 2020 public meeting. 1 Seven months
earlier, as COVID-19 led to widespread school closures in March, thenU.S. Secretary of Education Betsy DeVos waived federal requirements
for students to take year-end assessments. 2 Yet the waivers were only
for the 2019–20 school year. 3 The pandemic showed no signs of abating as the 2020–21 school year continued, and Illinois leaders wondered whether a new presidential administration would issue similar
waivers. 4
Such waivers come from the Elementary and Secondary
∗ J.D. and Master of Public Policy 2021, University of California, Berkeley. I
thank Professor Christopher Edley, Jr. and my classmates for their feedback and encouragement in developing this Essay. Copyright © 2021 by Justin Lam.
1. Samantha Smylie, Illinois School Leaders and Advocates Split on Decision on
Standardized Testing in a Pandemic, CHALKBEAT CHICAGO (Nov. 20, 2020, 1:01 PM),
https://chicago.chalkbeat.org/2020/11/20/21583266/illinois-school-leaders-and
-advocates-split-on-decision-on-standardized-testing-in-a-pandemic
[https://perma.cc/X2PQ-TYPC].
2. Matt Barnum & Kalyn Belsha, All States Can Cancel Standardized Tests This
Year, Trump and DeVos Say, CHALKBEAT (Mar. 20, 2020, 12:23 PM), https://www
.chalkbeat.org/2020/3/20/21196085/all-states-can-cancel-standardized-tests-this
-year-trump-and-devos-say [https://perma.cc/ZWX8-EZW5]; see also REBECCA A. SKINNER, CONG. RSCH. SERV., IF11517, SECRETARIAL WAIVER AUTHORITY UNDER THE ESEA AND
CARES ACT (2020), https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF11517
[https://perma.cc/72DZ-WLKB] (explaining the streamlined waiver process granted
to the Secretary of Education under the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security
Act (CARES Act)).
3. SKINNER, supra note 2, at 2.
4. Smylie, supra note 1.
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Education Act (ESEA), the main source of federal aid for education. 5 In
Fiscal Year 2020, Congress appropriated $25.9 billion for the Act’s
programs, which include Title I-A aid for disadvantaged students, Title
II teacher professional development, Title III English Learner (EL) instruction, Title IV safe and healthy students and charter school expansion programs. 6 The Act conditions Title I-A aid on assessments and
accountability: states must administer annual assessments in English/language arts and math in grades 3-8 and once in high school, as
well as science tests in some grade levels and annual English language
proficiency tests for English learners. 7 Each state must have an accountability system that “meaningfully differentiat[es]” between public schools and identifies the lowest-performing schools for comprehensive or targeted support and improvement. 8
The Act also contains a rare congressional delegation of power:
the power to waive Congress’s rules. 9 When a state educational
agency or tribal authority requests a waiver, section 8401 of the ESEA
allows the Secretary of Education to “waive any statutory or regulatory requirement,” 10 although some exceptions apply. 11 The Act specifies four grounds upon which the Secretary may deny a waiver request—including when a request fails to demonstrate how it “will
advance student academic achievement consistent with the purposes
of this Act.” 12
Prior Secretaries of Education have typically granted waivers in
response to changing conditions or state needs. As of publication, the
U.S. Department of Education website has responded to 488 requests
5. REBECCA A. SKINNER, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R45977, THE ELEMENTARY AND SECONDARY EDUCATION ACT (ESEA), AS AMENDED BY THE EVERY STUDENT SUCCEEDS ACT (ESSA): A
PRIMER
1
(2020),
https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R45977

[https://perma.cc/DBX7-2BMB].
6. Id.
7. Id. at 4–5.
8. Id. at 5–6.
9. See David J. Barron & Todd D. Rakoff, In Defense of Big Waiver, 113 COLUM. L.
REV. 265, 267 (2013) (defining “big waiver” as the “power to waive Congress’s rules”).
10. Elementary and Secondary Education Act § 8401, 20 U.S.C. § 6311. For simplicity, I use “state” herein to refer to state educational agencies or tribal authorities.
11. SKINNER, supra note 2, at 1. Under section 1118(b)(1) of the Elementary and
Secondary Education Act, a state or local educational agency may use Title I-A funds
“only to supplement” state and local funds, but not to supplant, or replace, such funds.
U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., SUPPLEMENT NOT SUPPLANT UNDER TITLE I, PART A OF THE ELEMENTARY
AND SECONDARY EDUCATION ACT OF 1965, AS AMENDED BY THE EVERY STUDENT SUCCEEDS
ACT
9
(2019),
https://www2.ed.gov/policy/elsec/leg/essa/
snsfinalguidance06192019.pdf [https://perma.cc/2KJ9-VQ8W].
12. Elementary and Secondary Education Act § 8401(b)(4)(A)(iii).
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received since 2009 for waivers of ESEA programs. 13 Most followed
the Great Recession (90 requests in 2009–10) or the emergence of
COVID-19 (154 in 2020), but states also submit waivers when natural
disasters occur, or when states want to take advantage of flexibilities
like trying new assessments. 14
Waivers can also enact policy priorities in the face of legislative
challenges. When Congress failed to reauthorize No Child Left Behind
in 2007, states risked losing federal funding for failing to meet proficiency targets. 15 The Obama Administration then enacted a conditional waiver scheme. 16 Unfortunately, that waiver scheme led Congress to constrain the Secretary’s waiver authority when it passed the
Every Student Succeeds Act of 2015. 17 But, within constraints, the Secretary still has relatively broad waiver authority. And that authority
can provide a key education policy tool.
Pressures facing the Biden Administration—as well as the latest
science on child development—should lead it to issue an interpretive
rule that interprets Section 8401 through the lens of whole child equity. An interpretive rule tells the public how an agency will construe
a statute it administers. 18 In the months and years ahead, the Administration will face pressures including whether to modify or waive annual testing requirements in future school years, how to advance the
Secretary’s stated priorities to “reimagine education” 19 with a slim
congressional majority and multiple legislative priorities, and how to
heed calls for a greater racial justice agenda. 20 At the same time, whole

13. State Requests for Waivers of ESEA Provisions for SSA-Administered Programs,
U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC. (last visited Sept. 2, 2021), https://oese.ed.gov/offices/office-of
-formula-grants/school-support-and-accountability/essa-state-plans-assessment
-waivers [https://perma.cc/43AX-FPYZ].
14. See, e.g., Letter from Frank T. Brogan to Sherri Ybarra & Debbie Critchfield
(Sept.
25,
2020),
https://oese.ed.gov/files/2020/09/Idaho-2021-Science
-Assessment-Waiver-letter-Extension.pdf [https://perma.cc/4JG9-CVFV] (extending
Idaho’s science assessment waiver); Letter from Frank T. Brogan to Tony Thurmond
& Linda Darling-Hammond (Sept. 25, 2020) https://oese.ed.gov/files/2020/03/
California-7.pdf [https://perma.cc/6JP2-L6Z7] (granting an assessment waiver to the
Paradise, California school district following the 2018 Camp Fire).
15. See infra Part I.B.
16. See id.
17. See infra Part I.C.
18. Perez v. Mortg. Bankers Ass’n, 575 U.S. 92, 97 (2015).
19. Matt Barnum, 5 Big Questions Facing Miguel Cardona, Biden’s Pick For Education Secretary, CHALKBEAT (Feb. 2, 2021, 4:39 PM), https://www
.chalkbeat.org/2020/12/23/22197906/5-big-questions-miguel-cardona-education
-secretary [https://perma.cc/7FCC-D59N].
20. See John B. King, Jr. & Marc. H. Morial, KING/MORIAL: Advocate for a Racial
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child equity research shows that adverse childhood experiences—and
schools’ academic, social, and emotional supports for students in the
wake of those experiences—affect “student achievement.” 21 The Secretary should interpret existing waiver authority to support a whole
child equity approach, using this research to inform the granting and
denial of waivers. 22
Part I describes the legislative history of Congress narrowing the
Secretary’s waiver authority. Part II shows that current law, courts,
and similar statutes support the Secretary’s relatively broad discretion. Part III explains why this broad discretion effectuates congressional intent. Part IV proposes an interpretative rule to guide the
waiver process, and analyzes how such a rule could advance the Biden
Administration’s priorities.
I. A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF NARROWING AUTHORITY

The ESEA has progressed from not even including waivers, to including them as a response to a growth in federal programs, to restricting them. The arc of waiver authority follows a broader arc of the
Act from a targeted, equity-focused statute to an outcome-focused
statute—and, most recently, to an Act reflecting a call for a greater
urge for education federalism. Yet the Act’s waiver provision has remained relatively unchanged.
A. FROM FUNDING TO “FLEXIBILITY”

At its outset in 1965, the ESEA did not contain a waiver provision.
The Act provided funds to promote equal educational opportunities
and attached discrimination prohibitions to those funds, 23 but required states to do little in exchange. 24 States had to submit plans, but
only to describe how they would spend funds for school library
Justice Agenda at the U.S. Department of Education, WASH. INFORMER (Dec. 15, 2020),
https://www.washingtoninformer.com/king-morial-advocate-for-a-racial-justice
-agenda-at-the-u-s-department-of-education/ [https://perma.cc/7XRW-HDCV].
21. See Elementary and Secondary Education Act § 8401(b)(4)(A)(iii) (requiring
that waiver applications demonstrate how a requested waiver will advance “student
achievement”); infra Part IV.A (explaining whole child equity).
22. For a discussion of this approach, see infra Part IV.A.
23. Derek W. Black, Abandoning the Federal Role in Education: The Every Student
Succeeds Act, 105 CAL. L. REV. 1309, 1317 (2017). Congress did not explicitly address
desegregation in the Elementary and Secondary Education Act. But, because Title VI of
the Civil Rights Act of 1965 prohibited discrimination in all federally funded programs,
the new federal programs the Act funded enabled the federal government to effectuate
Title VI protections. Id. at 1319.
24. Id. at 1318.
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resources, textbooks, and other instructional materials. 25 By the late
1970s and early 1980s, however, disillusionment with desegregation
efforts, disappointment with ESEA results, and a movement toward
states’ rights each grew. 26 Congress stopped increasing funding for
the Act, and made funds resemble general aid and block grants rather
than target them at resource equity. 27
At the same time, a “flexibility” narrative had taken hold. Federal
education programs had expanded to target specific groups of students, like the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, or subject
areas, such as the Carl D. Perkins Vocational-Technical Education
Act. 28 These programs yielded concerns ranging from burdensome
paperwork to, as then-Florida Commissioner of Education Frank Brogan put it, a “one size fits all command and control approach that we
in the states are abandoning.” 29
As Congress increased funds for the highest-needs districts in the
Improving America’s Schools Act, the 1994 reauthorization of the
ESEA, 30 it created a new ESEA waiver provision. The waiver provision
“recognize[d] the need for greater local flexibility” 31 to support states’
efforts to increase instructional quality or student academic performance. 32 The Act outlined a waiver request procedure, included exceptions to the Secretary’s waiver authority, capped the length of
waivers to three years, and required local educational agencies, states,
25. Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965, Pub. L. 89-10 § 203, 79 Stat.
37–38 (1965).
26. Black, supra note 23, at 1321–22.
27. Id.
28. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, HEHS99-17, ED-FLEX STATES VARY IN IMWAIVER
PROCESS
4
(1997),
https://www.gao.gov/
PLEMENTATION
OF
assets/230/226596.pdf [https://perma.cc/E79C-HZMA].
29. H.R. REP. NO. 106-43, at 9 (1999). Brogan became the Assistant Secretary of
Elementary and Secondary Education during the Trump Administration.
30. Black, supra note 23, at 1322–23.
31. See S. REP. NO. 103-292, at 46–47 (1994). The Senate Committee on Labor and
Human Resources “recognize[d] the need for greater local flexibility in the administration of Federal education programs,” thus “support[ing] the use of waivers for the purpose of improving services and student performance.” Democrats and Republicans
alike continued calls for flexibility throughout the 1990s. President Bill Clinton, for example, bragged about how his administration had “granted 357 waivers,” how the federal government had no “business telling you whom to hire, how to teach, [or] how to
run schools,” and how he had “vigorously supported more school-based management,
and more flexibility” for states. H.R. REP. NO. 106-43, at 10 (1999).
32. Improving America’s Schools Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-382, 108 Stat. 3518,
3899 (1994).
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and tribal authorities to submit annual reports to the Secretary. 33
Many of these requirements exist today.
B. NO CHILD LEFT BEHIND INCREASES FLEXIBILITY IN EXCHANGE FOR
ACCOUNTABILITY

The No Child Left Behind Act of 2001 doubled down on trading
flexibility for accountability, but left waiver requirements largely the
same as before. No Child Left Behind imposed far more accountability
requirements than previous iterations of Title I 34: in exchange for
more federal funds than before, states had to adopt challenging academic standards for English, math, and science; assess student proficiency; achieve proficiency in those subjects by 2014; disaggregate
school performance by subgroups; and apply consequences to schools
that failed to meet adequate yearly progress toward proficiency. 35 But
states could design their own standards and curricula 36 while receiving funds that still resembled block grants and general aid. 37 Meanwhile, the House Committee on Education and the Workforce largely
“continued the scope” 38 of the Secretary’s waiver authority. The Committee left most of the Act’s waiver language untouched, including a
requirement that a state, local educational agency, or tribe requesting
a waiver describe how a waiver would “increase the quality of instruction for students” and “improve the academic achievement of students.” 39
Ten years later, and following a failed reauthorization attempt by
Congress in 2007, the ESEA was overdue for reauthorization. 40 Without reauthorization, if schools failed to meet the Act’s proficiency targets by 2014—the year all learners were supposed to be proficient—
they would lose federal funds. 41 And, as Secretary of Education Arne
Duncan announced, 80 percent of the nation’s schools would fail to
33. Id. at 3899–3901.
34. Black, supra note 23, at 1324 (“The NCLB imposed far more requirements and
accountability than any prior version of Title I. In exchange for an influx of resources,
it required states to meet several absolute benchmarks.”).
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. See supra Part I.A.
38. H.R. REP. NO. 107-334, at 368 (2001).
39. No Child Left Behind Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-110, § 9401(b)(1)(B)(i)–(ii),
115 Stat. 1425, 1972 (2002). A local educational agency usually refers to local school
districts. See Elementary and Secondary Education Act § 8101(30) (defining “local educational agency”).
40. Black, supra note 23, at 1328–29.
41. Id. at 1329.
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meet proficiency targets. 42 The Obama Administration then created
ESEA Flexibility, through which Secretary Duncan would waive state
and local violations of the No Child Left Behind Act if states adopted
reforms like those of the earlier Race to the Top program. 43 These included adopting college- and career-ready standards; developing annual measurable goals and focusing turnaround efforts on the lowestperforming schools; implementing teacher and principal evaluation
systems that differentiated performance based in part on student
data; and removing reporting requirements that had little or no impact on student outcomes. 44 Forty-five states, the District of Columbia,
Puerto Rico, and the Bureau of Indian Education submitted requests
for flexibility. 45
Through waiver conditions, the Obama Administration revamped much of No Child Left Behind. Whereas No Child Left Behind
gave states autonomy to set curricular standards, the waiver conditions required states to adopt college- and career-ready standards—
effectively, the Common Core State Standards or comparable ones. 46
No Child Left Behind made no mention of teacher evaluations, but the
waiver application required states to adopt “high-quality” teacher and
principal evaluation systems with multiple elements. 47 Waivers also
did away with multiple No Child Left Behind proficiency requirements. 48 In doing so, the White House seized “an opportunity to fix
what’s wrong with No Child Left Behind without waiting any longer
for Congress to act.” 49
But national political opposition arose in response to the waiver
conditions. Aggravation with the Common Core standards, highstakes testing, and the weight of testing in teacher evaluations fueled
42. Id.
43. Id. at 1329–30. Under Race to the Top, a competitive grant program established by the Department using funds from the American Recovery and Reinvestment
Act, states had to adopt reforms in order to be eligible for grant funding.
44. Id.
https://www2.ed.gov/
45. ESEA
Flexibility, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC.,
policy/elsec/guid/esea-flexibility/index.html [https://perma.cc/2EDM-BX3S] (last
visited Sept. 2, 2021).
46. Black, supra note 23, at 1330.
47. U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., ESEA FLEXIBILITY 3 (2012), https://www2.ed.gov/
policy/eseaflex/approved-requests/flexrequest.doc [https://perma.cc/C8BC-D8PL].
48. Black, supra note 23, at 1330.
49. Megan Slack, Everything You Need to Know: Waivers, Flexibility, and Reforming
No Child Left Behind, WHITE HOUSE (Feb. 9, 2012), https://obamawhitehouse
.archives.gov/blog/2012/02/09/everything-you-need-know-waivers-flexibility-and
-reforming-no-child-left-behind [https://perma.cc/FS6S-B4RT].
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substantive objections. 50 Procedural objections stemmed from the
Obama Administration acting through administrative law rather than
going through Congress. 51
C. THE EVERY STUDENT SUCCEEDS ACT SIGNALS A RETURN TO FEDERALISM

In 2015, Congress limited the Secretary’s authority through the
Every Student Succeeds Act, the 2015 reauthorization of the ESEA. 52
The Every Student Succeeds Act rendered “null and void” the waivers
granted just three years earlier. 53 Yet it continued some of the substantive tenets of ESEA Flexibility: challenging, state-designed academic standards; annual testing; interventions for the lowest-performing schools; and certified (though not “highly qualified,” as the
waivers required) teachers. 54 Despite Congress nullifying its own
waivers and waiver authority, the Obama Administration lauded the
Every Student Succeeds Act’s codification of “many of the key reforms
the Administration ha[d] . . . encouraged states and districts to adopt
in exchange for waivers.” 55
Further, the Every Student Succeeds Act kept the Act’s waiver requirements mostly the same. Throughout iterations of the bill, Democrats and Republicans contested what the scope of the Secretary’s
waiver authority should be. 56 Yet the law kept the actual requirements
for a waiver—including that an application “reasonably demonstrat[e] that the waiver will improve instruction for students and advance student academic achievement”—largely intact. 57

D. COVID-19 LEADS TO WIDESPREAD ASSESSMENT WAIVERS—AND A
CONTRAST FROM NO CHILD LEFT BEHIND WAIVERS

About five years after the passage of the Every Student Succeeds
Act, the COVID-19 pandemic led to the largest push for waivers since
No Child Left Behind. As schools closed in March 2020, states moved

50. Black, supra note 23, at 1331–32.
51. Id.
52. See id.
53. Jessica Bulman-Pozen, Executive Federalism Comes to America, 102 VA. L. REV.
953, 989–90 (2016).
54. Black, supra note 23, at 1332–37; Bulman-Pozen, supra note 53, at 990–91.
55. Bulman-Pozen, supra note 53, at 990–91 (quoting WHITE HOUSE OFF. OF THE
PRESS SEC’Y, Fact Sheet: Congress Acts to Fix No Child Left Behind (Dec. 2, 2015)),
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2015/12/03/fact-sheet
-congress-acts-fix-no-child-left-behind [https://perma.cc/S6XG-WSTE]).
56. See H.R. REP. NO. 114-24, at 1104 (2015).
57. See id. at 135.
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to scrap math, reading, and science tests required by the Act. 58 Many
states applied for waivers from the U.S. Department of Education; two
scrapped their tests without waiting. 59 Congress directed the Secretary of Education to create an “expedited application process” 60 for
waiver requests. And it required states, tribes, and local school districts to describe how COVID-19 would prevent or restrict compliance
with Act requirements, and to assure that the state, tribe, or school
district would work to “mitigate any negative effects” that might result
from the waiver. 61 The Department published a template waiver request form and promised a one-day turnaround. 62 Every state, the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, and the Bureau
of Indian Education requested and received a waiver for the 2019–20
school year. 63
The next year, the Biden Administration declined to grant similar
“blanket waivers.” 64 Rather, the U.S. Department of Education “emphasize[d] the importance of flexibility.” 65 It suggested states could
58. Matt Barnum, Pressure Mounts for Feds to Drop State Testing Requirements
Amid Widespread School Closures, CHALKBEAT (Mar. 19, 2020, 9:20 AM),
https://www.chalkbeat.org/2020/3/18/21196059/pressure-mounts-for-feds-to
-drop-state-testing-requirements-amid-widespread-school-closures [https://perma
.cc/CEC8-BCHV].
59. Id.
60. Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security (CARES) Act, Pub. L. No. 116136, § 3511(b)(1), 134 Stat. 281, 400 (2020). Although outside the scope of this Essay,
checkbox or form waivers warrant further study. In emergency situations like COVID19, these forms can expedite applications and exemplify a federal intervention to help
states. Of course, such forms might make it too easy for an executive to waive statutory
safeguards.
61. Id. § 3511(c)(2).
62. Template COVID Fiscal Waiver 19-2020, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC.,
https://oese.ed.gov/files/2020/04/template-covid-fiscal-waiver-19-2020.pdf [https:
//perma.cc/FLU4-XN67]. The template required states to assure that they would ensure compliance, mitigate “negative effects,” and provide notice-and-comment opportunities.
63. BETSY DEVOS, REPORT TO CONGRESS OF U.S. SECRETARY OF EDUCATION BETSY
DEVOS: RECOMMENDED WAIVER AUTHORITY UNDER SECTION 3511(D)(4) OF DIVISION A OF
THE CORONAVIRUS AID, RELIEF, AND ECONOMIC SECURITY ACT (“CARES ACT”) 10 (Apr. 27,
2020),
https://www2.ed.gov/documents/coronavirus/cares-waiver-report.pdf
[https://perma.cc/RA4N-SCEA]. Thirty days after the CARES Act passed, Secretary of
Education Betsy DeVos declined to request additional waiver authority from Congress
for the Every Student Succeeds Act.
64. Letter from Ian Rosenblum, Acting Assistant Secretary of Elementary and Secondary Education, to Chief State School Officers 2 (Feb. 22, 2021),
https://www2.ed.gov/policy/elsec/guid/stateletters/dcl-assessments-and-acct
-022221.pdf [https://perma.cc/547K-JQ35].
65. Id.
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administer shorter, remote, or later-than-usual versions of their
statewide assessments. 66 The Department maintained all state and local report card requirements, including requirements to disaggregate
data by subgroups. But the Department invited states to request waivers from accountability requirements to identify low-performing
schools and require at least 95 percent of students to take year-end
assessments, 67 and provided a checkbox template for doing so. 68
States’ assessment waiver requests varied, as did the Department’s responses. 69 The Department granted the District of Columbia
the only blanket waiver from assessments; denied a similar request
from New York; denied Michigan’s and Montana’s requests to let
school districts administer local (rather than statewide) assessments;
approved Oregon’s plan to test students in fewer grades; and told New
Jersey and California that waivers were not needed to administer
statewide assessments in the fall or in all districts except where “not
viable,” respectively. 70 But 41 states, the District of Columbia, Puerto
Rico, and the Bureau of Indian Education received waivers for relief
from the Act’s accountability requirements. 71
Unlike No Child Left Behind waivers, COVID-19 waivers occurred
within a much different Overton window, or range of policies
66. Id. The Department did, however, “specifically encourage” states to extend
testing windows for English language proficiency assessments. Given that these assessments provide a diagnostic for students’ language needs, Paul Bruno and Dan
Goldhaber suggest that these assessments enjoy more political support and less
pushback than other assessments. PAUL BRUNO & DAN GOLDHABER, CALDER POLICY BRIEF
NO. 26-0721, REFLECTIONS ON WHAT PANDEMIC-RELATED STATE TEST WAIVER REQUESTS
SUGGEST ABOUT THE PRIORITIES FOR THE USE OF TESTS 5–6, NAT’L CTR. FOR ANALYSIS OF LONGITUDINAL DATA IN EDUC. RSCH. (2021), http://caldercouncil.org/wp-content/
uploads/2021/07/CALDER%20Policy%20Brief%2026-0721.pdf [https://perma.cc/
JSV3-YVYG].
67. See Letter from Ian Rosenblum to Chief State School Officers, supra note 64;
Evie Blad & Andrew Ujifusa, Biden Education Department Approves One Request to Cancel State Tests But Rejects Others, EDUC. WEEK (Apr. 7, 2021), https://www
.edweek.org/policy-politics/biden-education-department-approves-one-request-to
-cancel-state-tests-but-rejects-others/2021/04 [https://perma.cc/BCG6-ZBP6].
68. U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., OMB NO. 1810-0752, 20-21 ACCOUNTABILITY WAIVER TEMPLATE (Mar. 8, 2021), https://oese.ed.gov/files/2021/03/20-21-Accountability
-Waiver-Template-Final.pdf [https://perma.cc/TZG9-98DE].
69. See Blad & Ujifusa, supra note 67.
70. Id.
71. Andrew Ujifusa, The Feds Offered Waivers on ESSA Accountability. Here’s
Where States Stand on Getting Them, EDUC. WEEK (June 24, 2021), https://www
.edweek.org/policy-politics/the-feds-offered-waivers-on-essa-accountability-heres
-where-states-stand-on-getting-them/2021/06 [https://perma.cc/T58N-BJRE].
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politically acceptable to the mainstream. 72 No Child Left Behind waivers responded to a consensus on rigorous state standards and student
assessment-informed teacher evaluations. 73 But COVID-19 waivers
responded to a need to balance competing interests. Civil rights
groups called for statewide assessments as a comparative tool, while
education leaders differed in what, if any, purposes that testing would
serve. 74 And, whereas schools risked losing federal funds without No
Child Left Behind waivers, COVID-19 waivers were decided independent of school funding from the CARES Act or the American Rescue
Plan, both of which Congress mostly distributed through the Title I
formula of the ESEA. 75 The COVID-19 era of waivers might confirm the
demise of policymaking through education waivers or reflect the difficulty in balancing competing visions of assessments and accountability when deciding waiver criteria. Or this era might be an outlier in
the history of waivers, given the greater political attention on school
reopenings or stimulus funding. Still, unlike the expressed waiver language in the CARES Act, Congress did not include language in the
American Rescue Plan Act of 2021 encouraging or restricting the Secretary’s waiver discretion. 76
* * *
Congress has narrowed the Secretary’s waiver authority over
time. But the implementing requirements have largely remained the
same, informing the Secretary’s current discretion.
72. See Anand Giridharadas, How America’s Elites Lost Their Grip, TIME (Nov. 21,
2019, 6:39 AM), https://time.com/5735384/capitalism-reckoning-elitism-in
-america-2019/ [https://perma.cc/M8E9-6HKB] (describing the origins of the “Overton window” theory).
73. See supra Part I.B.
74. See Andrew Ujifusa, Standardized Tests Could Be in Jeopardy in Wake of Biden
Decisions, Experts Say, EDUC. WEEK (July 21, 2021), https://www.edweek.org/teaching
-learning/standardized-tests-could-be-in-jeopardy-in-wake-of-biden-decisions
-experts-say/2021/07 [https://perma.cc/4VSU-TBCR].
75. See Matt Barnum, Some States Were Still Hoping to Cancel Testing. The Biden
Administration Just Said No., CHALKBEAT (Mar. 29, 2021, 12:47 PM),
https://www.chalkbeat.org/2021/3/26/22353209/state-testing-cancellations
-waivers-biden-departement-education [https://perma.cc/VZ25-CXUX]; see also
American Rescue Plan Act of 2021 § 2001(c); Matt Barnum & Kalyn Belsha, Unprecedented Federal Funding Is on the Way. High-Poverty Schools Are Starting to Reckon With
How To Spend It., CHALKBEAT (Mar. 25, 2021, 4:07 PM), https://www
.chalkbeat.org/2021/3/25/22350474/unprecedented-federal-funding-high-poverty
-schools-how-spend [https://perma.cc/EU9P-RDZP].
76. Compare CARES Act § 3511(b)(1), with American Rescue Plan Act of 2021,
H.R. 1319, 117th Cong. § 2001 (2021).
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Today, the Secretary of Education enjoys relatively broad waiver
discretion. First, the waiver statute gives the Secretary broad discretion. Second, few courts have challenged—much less ruled on—the
waiver provision. Third, similarly broad provisions abound in federal
statutes.

A. THE STATUTE GIVES THE SECRETARY RELATIVELY BROAD WAIVER
AUTHORITY

Section 8401 of the ESEA allows the Secretary of Education to
“waive any statutory or regulatory requirement of this chapter for
which a waiver request is submitted” by a state educational agency or
tribal authority. 77 To request a waiver, a state educational agency or
tribal authority must submit a plan that fulfills certain requirements,
including describing “how the waiving of such requirements will advance student academic achievement,” how the state agency will monitor implementation, and how the agency will serve the same populations served by the programs to be waived. 78 The agency must also
provide for notice and comment, and summarize the comments. 79 After a state submits a waiver request, the Secretary has 120 days to
provide an initial determination. If the Secretary disapproves, the Secretary must offer the state a chance to revise its application and resubmit. If the resubmission still fails to meet the requirements, the
Secretary must offer a hearing on the record. 80 If the Secretary approves, a state must provide an annual report on progress, and the
Secretary may terminate the waiver if it is not “contribut[ing] to the
progress of schools” or “no longer necessary to achieve its original
purposes.” 81
Under section 8401, the Secretary’s may disapprove a waiver request if the request:
• (i) fails to meet submission requirements listed in Section 8401
of the Act; 82
77. Elementary and Secondary Education Act § 8401. A local educational agency
may do so through its state educational agency.
78. Id. § 8401(b)(1).
79. Id. § 8401(b)(3)(A)–(B). To be clear, these differ from the notice and comment
requirements of the Administrative Procedure Act, and a search did not reveal implementing regulations.
80. Id. § 8401(a)(3).
81. Id. § 8401(f)(A)–(B).
82. Id. § 8401(b)(4)(A)(i).
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(ii) concerns items the Secretary may not waive, 83 such as the distribution of funds; “supplement, not supplant” requirements;
comparability of services requirements; “equitable participation” of private school students and teachers; parental participation and involvement; applicable civil rights requirements; requirements for charter schools under the Charter Schools
Program; and maintenance of effort requirements 84;
• (iii) provides “insufficient information to demonstrate” that a
waiver “will advance student academic achievement consistent
with the purposes of this Act,” 85 or
• (iv) does not provide for “adequate evaluation to ensure review
and continuous improvement of the plan.” 86
The Secretary may not deny a waiver request based on “conditions outside the scope” 87 of the waiver request. The Secretary could
not, for instance, condition a waiver of annual grade 8 science assessments on whether a state implements a new professional development program for educators of English Learners. Relatedly, the Secretary may not promulgate rules or regulations that add statewide
accountability system requirements, add or delete specific state
standards, specify academic assessments or weights for evaluation
systems, or specify school support or improvement strategies. 88 And
the Secretary may neither issue guidance that “provides a strictly limited or exhaustive list to illustrate successful implementation of provisions under this section,” nor require data collection beyond existing federal, state, or local reporting requirements. 89
Still, the Secretary has broad authority to grant or deny waivers.
The Secretary may deny a waiver, for instance, if its implementation
plan provides “insufficient information” to show that the requested
waiver will “advance student achievement consistent with the purposes of this Act.” 90 The department, however, has rarely denied waivers. Out of 488 responses to waiver requests issued since 2009, the
83. Id. § 8401(b)(4)(A)(ii).
84. Id. § 8401(c); see also SKINNER, supra note 2, at 1 (summarizing these requirements). The Secretary may not waive maintenance of effort requirements under Section 8401, but may waive such requirements under other Act provisions.
85. Elementary and Secondary Education Act § 8401(b)(4)(A)(iii).
86. Id. § 8401(b)(4)(A)(iv).
87. Id. § 8401(b)(4)(D).
88. Id. § 1111(e)(1)(B).
89. Id. § 1111(e)(1)(C)-(D).
90. Id. § 8401(a)(4)(A).
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Department has issued at least 40 denials—a little over 12 percent. 91
In 2018, for example, 27 states exceeded a statutory cap allowing no
more than one percent of students with the most significant cognitive
disabilities to participate in alternate assessments; 23 received a
waiver. 92 The following year, 36 states exceeded the cap, and 22 received a waiver. 93 To be clear, more denials would not necessarily lead
to better student outcomes. But the Secretary certainly has the flexibility to issue such denials.
B. COURTS HAVE SUPPORTED SECRETARIAL DISCRETION

Few states or school districts have challenged the Act’s waiver
arrangements. Neither the U.S. Supreme Court nor the federal circuit
courts have ruled on waivers, but two district court cases have supported agency discretion.
1. Connecticut v. Spellings

In Connecticut v. Spellings, a federal district court held that the
Secretary enjoys discretion to grant or deny a waiver because the decision is one “committed to the agency.” 94 Four years after the passage
of the No Child Left Behind Act, Connecticut sought a waiver and state
plan amendments to modify requirements related to annual testing,
testing of English Language Learners, and special education students. 95 After being denied waivers, Connecticut challenged Secretary
of Education Margaret Spellings’s waiver denials. 96 The court found
that even when Congress has not precluded review, section 701(a)(2)
of the Administrative Procedure Act precludes review if the governing
91. Author analysis of data from State Requests for Waivers of ESEA Provisions for
SSA-Administered Programs, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC. (last visited Sept. 2, 2021),
https://oese.ed.gov/offices/office-of-formula-grants/school-support-and
-accountability/essa-state-plans-assessment-waivers
[https://perma.cc/62GM
-VYPG].
92. See Letter from Rep. Robert C. “Bobby” Scott to Secretary Betsy DeVos 2 (Mar.
13,
2020),
https://edlabor.house.gov/imo/media/doc/
Chairman%20Scott%20Lett%20to%20ED%20re%20Title%20I%
20Alternative%20Assessments.pdf [https://perma.cc/42S5-XACB] (expressing concern about the Department of Education’s waivers of requirements for assessments for
students with the most significant cognitive disabilities).
93. Id.
94. Connecticut v. Spellings, 453 F. Supp. 2d 459, 495 (D. Conn. 2006) (quoting
the Secretary of Education’s reply brief).
95. See id. at 477.
96. Id. at 474. Connecticut challenged Secretary of Education Margaret Spellings’
interpretation of a No Child Left Behind provision barring unfunded mandates as well.
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statute provides a court “no meaningful standard” 97 against which to
judge the agency’s exercise of its discretion. In this case, the waiver
provision “[did] not provide any standard—let alone a meaningful
one” for judicial review. 98 Because of the agency’s discretion concerning waiver denials, the Secretary’s denial of waiver requests was not
reviewable under section 701(a)(2) of the Administrative Procedure
Act. 99
And the waiver provision offered no standards for reviewing the
denial of a specific waiver. 100 Although waiver requests had to include
specific information, 101 the No Child Left Behind Act “d[id] not require” 102 the Secretary to grant a waiver if a request contained this
information. Plus, the court reasoned, Congress had other ways of cabining the Secretary’s discretion. 103 Congress prevented the Secretary
from waiving a number of No Child Left Behind requirements; authorized only “effective” waiver extensions that “contributed to improved
student achievement” and were in the “public interest” 104; required an
annual report to Congress on the use of waivers and whether they had
increased instruction quality and academic achievement 105; and set
restrictions on terminating a waiver. 106 “It seems clear,” the court concluded, that Congress limited the Secretary of Education’s exercise of
discretion to grant waivers but left “completely unfettered” the Secretary’s discretion to deny a waiver. 107
2. Jindal v. United States Department of Education

Even when the Secretary used conditional waivers, a federal

97. Id. at 495 (quoting Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 830 (1985)).
98. Connecticut v. Spellings, 453 F. Supp. 2d 459, 495 (D. Conn. 2006).
99. Id. at 499.
100. Id. at 496; see also supra Part II.A (quoting the statute).
101. Spellings, 453 F. Supp. at 496 (“Requests must describe ‘for each school year,
specific, measurable educational goals . . . that would be affected by the waiver and the
methods to be used to measure annually such progress for meeting such goals.’”).
102. Id. at 496 (quoting 20 U.S.C. § 7861).
103. Id.
104. Connecticut v. Spellings, 453 F. Supp. 2d 459, 496 (D. Conn. 2006).
105. Id.
106. Id. (“The Act allows the Secretary to terminate a waiver only if the ‘Secretary
determines, after notice and an opportunity for a hearing, that the performance of the
State . . . has been inadequate to justify a continuation of the waiver or if the waiver is
no longer necessary to achieve its original purpose.’”).
107. Id. at 498, aff’d as modified sub nom. Connecticut v. Duncan, 612 F.3d 107 (2d
Cir. 2010). The Second Circuit upheld the district court’s dismissal of the case on ripeness grounds.
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district court found that the use of waivers did not violate the ESEA
and that the use of waiver conditions was constitutional. 108 In 2015,
Louisiana governor Bobby Jindal contended that the Obama Administration exceeded its constitutional authority when it enacted conditional waivers via ESEA Flexibility. 109 The court disagreed for two reasons.
First, the granting of waivers in exchange for adopting standards
“common to a significant number of states” did not exceed the Secretary’s authority. 110 The ESEA prohibits the Secretary from conditioning a state plan’s approval on adding or deleting “specific elements” of
its academic standards, using “specific assessment instruments,” or
approving or certifying state standards themselves. 111 Jindal claimed
that requiring states to adopt the Common Core State Standards and
PARCC assessments amounted to requiring a state to add or delete elements from its standards and assessments. 112 But Jindal failed to
show any evidence that the ESEA Flexibility scheme did so. 113
Second, the court declined to find ESEA Flexibility’s conditions
“coercive.” 114 Jindal alleged that refusing to agree to the waiver conditions could ultimately mean losing ESEA funds. 115 Even so, the conditional waiver program itself did “not award funds to States or threaten
state funding.” 116 In National Federation of Independent Businesses v.
Sebelius, Affordable Care Act conditions were “viewed as a means of
pressuring the States to accept policy changes” to Medicaid. 117 But
ESEA Flexibility conditions—such as encouraging states to adopt college and career ready standards and aligned assessments—“protec[ted], rather than threaten[ed]” funding. 118 And Jindal provided no
evidence that states were unaware of the program’s conditions or the
108. Jindal v. U.S. Dep’t of Educ., No. CV 14-534-SDD-RLB, 2015 WL 5474290, at
*10, 13 (M.D. La. Sept. 16, 2015).
109. Id. at *2 (M.D. La. Sept. 16, 2015). For more information on ESEA Flexibility,
see supra Part I.B.
110. Jindal, 2015 WL 5474290, at *10.
111. Id. at *9.
112. Id. PARCC was a consortium of states that developed a set of assessments
aligned to the Common Core State Standards. Id. at *2 n.18.
113. Id.
114. Jindal v. U.S. Dep’t of Educ., No. CV 14-534-SDD-RLB, 2015 WL 5474290, at
*14 (M.D. La. Sept. 16, 2015).
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id. (citing Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2602, 2604
(2012)).
118. Jindal, 2015 WL 5474290, at *14.
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Secretary’s broad waiver authority. 119 “States were free to apply or
not,” 120 and so was he. 121
Admittedly, Jindal’s allegations were not outliers. After the Department launched ESEA Flexibility, other states challenged the Department’s interpretation, one state sought an administrative hearing,
and House and Senate committees questioned the Secretary’s authority. 122 Still, the court found that the Secretary’s actions did not go beyond the scope of waiver authority under the ESEA.
C. SIMILAR PROVISIONS OFFER AGENCIES BROAD DISCRETION, WITH LIMITED
OR NO JUDICIAL REVIEW

Multiple federal statutes grant agencies waiver discretion and do
so with minimal or no judicial review. The Connecticut v. Spellings
court pointed to statutes that, for instance, vested the decisionmaker
with authority to make substantive and procedural rules for resolving
claims under the September 11 Victim Compensation Fund, 123 or authorized payments to service providers “at such time or times as the
Secretary believes appropriate (but not less often than monthly).” 124
Each of these commit waiver requests to agency discretion, exempting
the requests from judicial review. 125
Of course, courts may review when an agency fails to conduct sufficient review or make adequate findings on the merits of a waiver. 126
Under the Administrative Procedure Act, if an agency relies on factors
that Congress did not intend for it to consider, fails to consider “an
important aspect of the problem,” offers a justification counter to the
evidence or that is “so implausible that it could not be ascribed to a
difference in view or the product of agency expertise,” a court may find

119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Jindal himself had enthusiastically supported the Common Core State Standards when Louisiana applied for them five years prior. Id. at *11 n.101.
122. Black, supra note 23, at 1331 (citing Rick Scott, Governor of Florida, Request
to Designate Jurisdiction to the Office of Administrative Law Judges (Oct. 17, 2014));
Sean D. Reyes, Attorney General, State of Utah, Common Core Standards Legal Analysis
(Oct. 7, 2014); EMILY BARBOUR, JODY FEDER & REBECCA SKINNER, CONG. RSCH. SERV., SECRETARY OF EDUCATION’S WAIVER AUTHORITY WITH RESPECT TO TITLE I-A PROVISIONS INCLUDED
IN THE ELEMENTARY AND SECONDARY EDUCATION ACT 6–7 (2011)).
123. Connecticut v. Spellings, 453 F. Supp. 2d 459, 498 (D. Conn. 2006) (citing
Schneider v. Feinberg, 345 F.3d 135, 149 (2d Cir. 2003)).
124. Id. (quoting Greater N.Y. Hosp. Ass’n v. Mathews, 536 F.2d 494, 497 (2d Cir.
1976)).
125. Id. at 497.
126. BARBOUR, FEDER & SKINNER, supra note 122, at 6.
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a waiver decision arbitrary and capricious. 127 The Ninth Circuit, for
instance, found that the Secretary of Health and Human Services
granted California a waiver to cut a benefits program without conducting sufficient review or making adequate findings regarding the
merits of the waiver. 128 But that case involved a record that contained
“no evidence” 129 that the Secretary had considered the effects of cutting the program—and might suggest that only an “extraordinarily
sparse” 130 record would trigger judicial review.
Courts, however, have not clarified the extent to which a waiver
must promote the objectives of its statute. 131 Take section 1115 of the
Social Security Act, under which states may receive a federal waiver
to try approaches that differ from the requirements of Medicaid. 132
Congress required that a waiver request, “in the judgment of the Secretary, [be] likely to assist in promoting the objectives of [the Act].” 133
Medicaid aims to “furnish . . . medical assistance on behalf of families
with dependent children and of aged, blind, or disabled individuals,
whose income and resources are insufficient to meet the costs of necessary medical services.” 134 But no formulaic approach exists for how
a waiver might promote these objectives, or for how a court might
evaluate when a waiver runs afoul of these objectives. A waiver might,
for instance, expand eligibility for new beneficiaries but up costs for
existing beneficiaries. 135 Medicaid waivers thus illustrate how complicated tradeoffs in fulfilling statutory objectives can leave an agency
with plenty of discretion.
Even when discretion is subject to judicial review, courts have
not conclusively answered how to review such discretion. In Wood v.
Betlach, Arizona beneficiaries challenged a state waiver application
approved by the Secretary of Health and Human Services that would
impose higher copayments on them. 136 The court ignored the
See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A).
Beno v. Shalala, 30 F.3d 1057, 1073 (9th Cir. 1994).
Id. at 1075.
Id. at 1076.
See Edward H. Stiglitz, Forces of Federalism, Safety Nets, and Waivers, 18 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 125, 148–49 (2017).
132. Tracy Douglas, Medicaid Waivers and Consumer Protection: Evidence from the
States, 28 ANNALS HEALTH L. & LIFE SCI. 101, 104–05 (2019).
133. Stiglitz, supra note 131, at 147.
134. 42 U.S.C. § 1396-1.
135. Stiglitz, supra note 131, at 147–48.
136. Wood v. Betlach, 922 F. Supp. 2d 836 (D. Ariz. 2013); Stiglitz, supra note 131,
at 146–47.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
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question of whether the waiver as a whole had to satisfy the Social
Security Act’s objectives, or whether every component of a waiver had
to do so. 137 Rather, the court determined that copayments challenged
as part of a larger section 1115 waiver did not merit independent approval. 138 All in all, even when judicial review applies, courts may
struggle to check policy and political judgments—including those that
an education secretary may exercise.
III. THE SECRETARY SHOULD HAVE BROAD DISCRETION BECAUSE
BROAD DISCRETION EFFECTUATES CONGRESSIONAL INTENT

Even if the ESEA statute’s text, prior court decisions, and similar
statutes did not suggest broad discretion for the Secretary of Education, the Secretary should enjoy broad waiver discretion. When Congress delegates the power to waive provisions of law that Congress
itself has made, it advances its own statutory objectives by creating
regulatory flexibility. 139 In the ESEA, waivers give the Secretary flexibility to respond to changing conditions in the pursuit of the statute’s
objectives. That flexibility advances Congress’s intent even in the case
of conditional aid—contrary to what critics of No Child Left Behind
waivers asserted.
A. “BIG WAIVER” SCHEMES LIKE ESEA ADVANCE CONGRESSIONAL INTENT

The Secretary of Education should have the power to waive the
Act’s statutory requirements because Congress included a “big
waiver” in order to effectuate its objectives under changing conditions. A look at the nature of such waiver schemes, as well as the instant case of the Act, reflects Congress’s intent.
Agencies have had the power to apply enforcement discretion or
waive limited statutory requirements throughout U.S. history. 140 But
“big waiver” schemes, which might include the authority to waive almost any part of a statute or condition a waiver, are relatively new. 141
Unlike enforcement discretion, or the executive branch’s decision not
to enforce a statutory requirement, a “big waiver” scheme enjoys expressed statutory support. 142 Unlike a limited waiver, or a provision
that delegates a limited power to waive or modify requirements in
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.

Stiglitz, supra note 131, at 148.
Id.
See Barron & Rakoff, supra note 9, at 267, 270.
Id. at 271–77.
Id. at 267–68.
See id. at 273–76.
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exceptional cases, 143 a “big waiver” might allow an agency to waive
conditions with broad authority or without predicate conditions. 144
Such a scheme could obscure accountability or allow for the gutting of
social safety net programs under the guise of “flexibility.” 145 But such
a scheme can preserve Congress’s attempts to confer positive rights
through spending programs. 146 This provides a “safety valve” that can
release pressure when statutory objectives may not be attainable due
to changed circumstances. 147
The ESEA reflects such an attempt. In the 1990s, as a consensus
emerged that federal education funding schemes had become too
rigid, Congress did not remove the original statutory constraints. Instead, it delegated authority for removing statutory constraints to the
Secretary via waivers. 148 In education, states use the safety valve frequently. 149 A world without federal education waivers would be impractical: consider the flexibility needed to respond to emergencies,
like when Puerto Rico received a 2018 waiver following Hurricanes
Maria and Irma. 150 Or think about the benefits of piloting new assessments, as in the case of Hawaii’s 2017 waiver to pilot the Hawaiian
State Language Assessments. 151 Waivers allow the Secretary to respond to changing conditions in the pursuit of a “fair, equitable, and
high-quality education” for “all children.” 152
Of course, waivers in federal statutes can frustrate congressional
intent if not implemented judiciously. Take a recent analysis that finds
that waivers meant to improve Medicaid led to Michigan increasing
143. Id. at 277.
144. See id. at 278.
145. See id. at 269, 297.
146. See id. at 295.
147. Zachary S. Price, Seeking Baselines for Negative Authority: Constitutional and
Rule-of-Law Arguments over Nonenforcement and Waiver, 8 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 235, 266
(2016).
148. Id. at 297–98.
149. See supra Introduction.
150. Letter from Frank T. Brogan, Assistant Secretary for Elementary and Secondary Education, U.S. Department of Education, to Julia Keleher, Secretary of Education,
Puerto Rico Department of Education (Oct. 10, 2018), https://www2.ed.gov/
admins/lead/account/stateplan17/waivers/prschoolidentificationwaiverrequest.pdf
[https://perma.cc/24H8-DWAP].
151. Letter from Jason Botel, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary, U.S. Department of Education, to Christina Kishimoto, Superintendent, Hawaii State Department
of
Education
(Dec.
1,
2017),
https://www2.ed.gov/admins/lead/
account/stateplan17/waivers/hitesting2017.pdf [https://perma.cc/LQ4C-H263].
152. See Elementary and Secondary Education Act § 1001 (describing the purpose
of Title I-A aid).
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insurance premiums, Iowa disenrolling more than 14,000 beneficiaries from Medicaid, and Arkansas imposing work requirements on
adults enrolled in its Medicaid expansion. 153 Under the ESEA, recall
the Department of Education’s failure to properly monitor state assessments for students with significant cognitive disabilities. 154 Or recall the balancing act of flexibility and utility for assessments during
the pandemic—waiving, for instance, the requirement that 95 percent
of students take statewide assessments or allowing California districts
to essentially decide whether to give exams. 155 By allowing varying,
state-by-state testing waivers, some might argue that the U.S. Department of Education made assessments less useful. In short, without
guardrails, a “big waiver” can sometimes allow an agency to take Congress’s statutory objectives off track.
But two fixes can guard against the derailment of “big waiver”
schemes. First, Congress can limit waivers to those that achieve expressed statutory purposes. 156 Recall the expressed limitations on the
Secretary’s authority that persist under the ESEA. 157 And No Child Left
Behind required waiver applicants to show how a requested waiver
would “increase” instructional quality and “improve” student achievement, meaning that a proposed waiver should have shown that it
would produce results better than the statute’s baseline requirements. 158 The Every Student Succeeds Act requires applicants to show
how a waiver would “advance” student achievement. 159 Given the similarity of “advance” to “improve,” the presumed meaning—and legislative guidance—is likely the same. 160 Second, as discussed below,
agencies themselves can pair a waiver scheme with an interpretive
rule or policy guidance that furthers congressional intent.
B. CONDITIONAL WAIVERS ALSO ADVANCE CONGRESSIONAL INTENT

Waivers still effectuate congressional intent when granted with

153. Douglas, supra note 132, at 120–23, 126.
154. See Scott, supra note 92.
155. See Ujifusa, supra note 74.
156. See Barron & Rakoff, supra note 9, at 335.
157. See supra Part II.A.
158. Barron & Rakoff, supra note 9, at 336.
159. See supra Part II.A.
160. See Barron & Rakoff, supra note 9, at 336 (No Child Left Behind “add[ed] a
level of legislative guidance to the exercise of administrative discretion, and force to
the statutory scheme overall, that a bland delegation of the power to establish regulations to promote educational improvement would not.”).
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conditions, 161 contrary to what the opponents of ESEA Flexibility
might have argued. 162 Congress, of course, must make conditions clear
and limit agency discretion. Even though the backlash to ESEA Flexibility led to Congress doing the latter, conditional waivers themselves
are still constitutional.
Congress may allow—or decline to prohibit—an agency from imposing conditions in exchange for a waiver. 163 This gives an agency
flexibility to negotiate with a program participant and to induce the
participant’s continued participation. 164 Conditions can also help local
or state experiments achieve the objective’s statutes. 165 Opponents of
conditional waivers may argue that such waivers unconstitutionally
coerce a state into accepting requirements it would not have agreed
to otherwise. 166 But Sebelius and its related cases support a more narrow view. 167 Waivers—particularly conditional waivers—function as
a contract: in return for funds, states agree to comply with conditions. 168 Unconstitutional coercion only occurs when Congress takes
an entrenched program and tells states they can only participate in
that entrenched program if they also agree to participate in a separate,
unrelated program. 169
Essentially, the power to condition can be understood as the
power to effectuate statutory objectives, with two limits. 170 One limit
is that Congress must make conditions for states’ receipt of federal
funds “unambiguou[s]” so that states may be “cognizant of the choices
of their participation.” 171 The other is that the executive’s discretion
may be unfettered, but only within the aims and bounds of the originating statute. Executive officials can presume the authority to impose
conditions, but those conditions should reflect the aims and guardrails
of the statute as closely as possible. 172
ESEA Flexibility reflected a form of the second limit. Conditional
waivers can enable the executive branch to shape policy, but are more
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.

See id. at 235.
See supra Part I.A.
Price, supra note 147, at 266.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 270.
Id.
Id.
See id.
Id.
Id. at 270–71.
Id.
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likely to be controversial: recall the backlash to the program, 173 and
Congress adding a provision in the Every Student Succeeds Act forbidding the Secretary from imposing conditions outside the bounds of the
waiver request. 174 Although Congress curtailed the Secretary’s authority, that was not a referendum on the constitutionality of conditional waivers—or a limit on a future Congress removing that provision.
* * *
Waivers cannot appropriate more money for education, undo the
ESEA’s restrictions on secretarial authority, or fix federalism’s shortfalls when it comes to advancing equity. But, in the face of competing
priorities and congressional obstructions, they offer a tool not to be
overlooked.
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR WAIVER AUTHORITY

The Secretary of Education should make an “interpretative”
rule 175 interpreting section 8401 waiver authority to advance a
whole-child approach to student achievement. Such a rule could advance priorities that will benefit students across the country, including in areas like testing, state plan amendments, and desegregation.

A. INTERPRETING WAIVER REQUESTS IN A “WHOLE CHILD” MANNER

An interpretive rule advises the public about how an agency will
construe a statute it administers. 176 Under the ESEA, the Secretary can
interpret the “advance student achievement” language of the Act to
shape future waiver decisions. And such an interpretation would reflect the latest research—already embraced by Congress and the
White House—on child development and add transparency, while
providing a faster route than notice-and-comment rulemaking.

1. Interpreting the Act’s Waiver Provisions

Under the Administrative Procedure Act, Congress distinguished
legislative rules from “interpretive rules” and “general statements of
policy.” 177 Unlike legislative rules, which must go through notice-and173. See id.
174. See Elementary and Secondary Education Act § 8401(b)(4)(D).
175. See 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(A) (2020) (defining interpretive rules).
176. Perez v. Mortg. Bankers Ass’n, 575 U.S. 92, 97 (2015).
177. Id.; see also DANIEL A. FARBER, LISA HEINZERLING & PETER M. SHANE, REFORMING
“REGULATORY REFORM”: A PROGRESSIVE FRAMEWORK FOR AGENCY RULEMAKING IN THE PUBLIC
INTEREST 13 (2018), https://www.acslaw.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/10/
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comment rulemaking, 178 the U.S. Office of Management and Budget
considers interpretive rules as a type of agency guidance. 179 Interpretive rules do not carry the force and effect of law and are not accorded
such weight during judicial review, 180 largely because they do not impose “legally binding obligations or prohibitions.” 181 In turn, Congress
did not subject interpretive rules to notice-and-comment requirements. 182 This makes the process of issuing them “comparatively easier for agencies than issuing legislative rules.” 183
The Secretary should take advantage of this process. Under section 8401(b)(1) of the ESEA, states requesting a waiver must describe
“how the waiving of such requirements will advance student academic
achievement,” how the state agency will monitor implementation, and
how the agency will serve the same populations served by the programs to be waived. 184 Further, a waiver recipient must report annually on the “progress” of schools covered under the waiver “toward
improving student academic achievement,” and how the use of the
waiver has contributed to such progress.” 185 To date, neither federal
regulations nor departmental guidance appear to have interpreted
these provisions. The Secretary could interpret these aspects in a
manner supporting whole child equity, which refers to a child-centered transformation of instructional, social, and emotional learning
policy responses. 186
Whole child equity acknowledges that adverse childhood experiences like trauma and chronic stress—often associated with poverty,
race, ethnicity, and disability—affect how children develop and
Oct-2018-APA-Farber-Heinzerling-Shane-issue-brief.pdf
[https://perma.cc/RQG9
-3HFW].
178. See 5 U.S.C. § 553.
179. See 72 Fed. Reg. 3432, 3434 (2007) (defining agency guidance as an “agency
statement of general applicability and future effect . . . that sets forth a policy on a statutory, regulatory, or technical issue or an interpretation of a statutory or regulatory
issue.”).
180. Perez v. Mortg. Bankers Ass’n, 575 U.S. 92, 97 (2015).
181. Ass’n of Flight Attendants-CWA, AFL-CIO v. Huerta, 785 F.3d 710, 716 (D.C.
Cir. 2015).
182. Perez, 575 U.S. at 96.
183. Id. at 97.
184. Elementary and Secondary Education Act § 8401(b)(1).
185. Id. § 8401(e).
186. The Urgent Need for Whole Child Equity, OPPORTUNITY INST., https://
theopportunityinstitute.org/whole-child-equity [https://perma.cc/Q3Y5-E4XF] (last
visited Sept. 2, 2021).
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learn. 187 It realizes that children need environments that support
their learning needs, and support mental health needs or basic needs
like nutrition and shelter. 188 And it means that school systems should
(1) focus accountability, guidance, and investments on developmental
supports; (2) design schools to provide for healthy development; and
(3) enable educators to better support students from a diverse range
of contexts. 189
To apply whole child equity via an interpretive rule, the Secretary
might issue non-binding guidance that first explains the science behind whole child equity and how schools might apply the approach in
school and systems design. 190 The guidance would state that, where
applicable, a waiver request and its corresponding implementation
plan “advance student achievement” 191 when it furthers a state’s attempts to support holistic child development. That guidance might offer examples of scenarios in which the Department might deny a
waiver for failing to document how it would “advance student
achievement.” 192 And the guidance could urge states to include in
their annual reports 193 updates on schools’ progress toward advancing students’ socioemotional needs as part of their efforts to support
student achievement.
In practice, the Secretary might evaluate a state’s compliance
with waiver notice-and-comment requirements by assessing the degrees to which a state or local educational agency reached out to historically underrepresented populations—those with children most
likely to suffer from adverse childhood experiences—when informing
the public about the proposed waiver. 194 The Secretary might advise
states that, pursuant to section 8401’s requirement that waivers include “adequate evaluation to ensure review and continuous
187. See OPPORTUNITY INST., WHOLE CHILD EQUITY PROJECT 1, https://
learningpolicyinstitute.org/sites/default/files/Opportunity_Institute_Whole_Child_
Equity.pdf [https://perma.cc/4FRG-5SFL] (last visited Sept. 2, 2021); LINDA DARLINGHAMMOND & CHANNA M. COOK-HARVEY, LEARNING POLICY INST., EDUCATING THE WHOLE
CHILD: IMPROVING SCHOOL CLIMATE TO SUPPORT STUDENT SUCCESS v-vi (2018),
https://learningpolicyinstitute.org/sites/default/files/product-files/
Educating_Whole_Child_REPORT.pdf [https://perma.cc/8Y7A-PQAT].
188. See OPPORTUNITY INST., supra note 187.
189. See DARLING-HAMMOND & COOK-HARVEY, supra note 187, at ix-x.
190. See id.
191. Elementary and Secondary Education Act § 8401(b)(4)(A)(iii).
192. Id. § 8401(b)(1).
193. See id. § 8401(e).
194. Id. § 8401(b)(3)(A)–(B).
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improvement,” 195 an “adequate” evaluation might assess the degree to
which plans support child development. The Secretary could decline
to waive Act provisions that already support whole child equity, such
as insisting that states continue to disaggregate school quality and
support indicators by race and other student characteristics. 196 And
the Secretary’s application of whole child equity might look different
for waiver requests after, say, a natural disaster (when an adverse
childhood experience already informs a state’s choice to seek a
waiver) compared to piloting a new assessment (when that assessment is one piece of a broader accountability system that may or may
not take a whole child equity approach).
2. Justifications

As challenges face the Biden Administration—like responding to
COVID-19 or articulating an overarching school improvement approach 197—three reasons justify such an interpretive rule.
First, research has embraced a multi-dimensional picture of academic achievement. So has Congress and the White House. The Every
Student Succeeds Act already reflects this understanding, 198 as do
multiple bills introduced in the most recent Congress. 199 What is
more, the Biden Administration’s recent “Return to School Roadmap”
tells schools to prioritize student health and safety in school reopening decisions—indeed, that meeting students’ social and emotional
needs is “foundational” to helping students “overcome” the effects of
adverse experiences. 200 Thus, interpreting waiver requests in this
195. Id. § 8401(b)(4)(A)(iv).
196. See DARLING-HAMMOND & COOK-HARVEY, supra note 187, at 42 (describing indicators of suspension and expulsion under the Elementary and Secondary Education
Act).
197. See Barnum, supra note 19.
198. See, e.g., Elementary and Secondary Education Act § 1114(b)(7)(iii)(I) (requiring plans for schoolwide programs to address the needs of all children, which may
include “counseling, school-based mental health programs, specialized instructional
support services, mentoring services, and other strategies to improve students’ skills
outside the academic subject areas”); Elementary and Secondary Education Act §
4108(B)(ii)(II) (providing grants for school-based mental health partnerships that
provide “comprehensive” services and supports and staff development “based on
trauma-informed practices”).
199. See, e.g., Strength in Diversity Act of 2020, H.R. 2639, 116th Cong. (2d Sess.
2020); Counseling Not Criminalization in Schools Act, S. 4360, 116th Cong. (2d Sess.
2020).
200. U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., OFF. OF PLAN., EVALUATION AND POL’Y DEV., ED COVID-19
HANDBOOK, VOLUME 2: ROADMAP TO REOPENING SAFELY AND MEETING ALL STUDENTS’ NEEDS
8
(2021),
https://www2.ed.gov/documents/coronavirus/reopening-2.pdf
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manner would fulfill and advance congressional intent.
Second, doing so would add transparency while preserving the
Secretary’s flexibility. An interpretive rule would advise state and local educational agencies and tribes about the Department’s interpretations. Although a whole child equity approach could appear to
muddy waiver decisions on “academic” topics like annual assessments, research shows that multiple factors can affect a child’s academic achievement, such as certified and experienced teachers, social
emotional learning supports, and access to health care. 201 To that end,
an interpretive rule would confirm that advancing “achievement” cannot be just understood to consist of academic achievement, and that
addressing nonacademic factors bears on students’ academic achievement.
Such a rule would preserve flexibility by establishing a clear,
transparent standard of review. An interpretive rule would preserve
decision-making power with the Secretary while adding insight to
how those decisions are made. Especially on the heels of an administration that did not always clarify how it came to waiver decisions, 202 an interpretive rule would show the Biden Administration’s
commitment to meeting the needs of all students. 203 It would also add
transparency to what the administration would not waive: proposals
that do not consider whole child needs when opportunities to do so
exist, and existing protections within the Every Student Succeeds Act
that provide key safeguards for advancing equity.
Additional procedures like a formal, on-the-record hearing for
waivers or having state officials review each other’s requests through
a peer review process might offer similar transparency. But these procedures would add more than what section 8401, which vests waiver
decisions with the Secretary and separates initial determinations
[https://perma.cc/9C3G-2UJN].
201. See HEATHER CLAPP PADGETTE, CANDACE WEBB & PHYLLIS JORDAN, HOW MEDICAID
AND CHIP CAN SUPPORT STUDENT SUCCESS THROUGH SCHOOLS 3 (2019),
https://ccf.georgetown.edu/wp-content/uploads/2019/04/Student-Success
-Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/V8UU-TTSW].
202. See Scott, supra note 92 (expressing concern that the Department of Education’s ongoing use of waivers for assessments for students with significant cognitive
disabilities “delayed implementation of a core requirement in ESSA”).
203. See The Biden Plan for Educators, Students, and Our Future, JOE BIDEN,
https://joebiden.com/education/ [https://perma.cc/X4J5-PMWR] (last visited Sept.
2, 2021); BIDEN-SANDERS UNITY TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATIONS 79 (July 8, 2020),
https://joebiden.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/08/UNITY-TASK-FORCE
-RECOMMENDATIONS.pdf [https://perma.cc/FLX2-8L88].
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from formal, on-the-record hearings, 204 requires. And such procedures could drain agency resources or delay waiver decisions, 205 or
might open those decisions up to different interpretations of “advanc[ing] student achievement” 206 in ways that forego the clarity and
consistency of an interpretive rule. Even if an interpretive rule for
whole child equity did not lead to watershed changes in day-to-day
waiver reviews or were not applicable in some instances, an interpretive rule would provide a procedural way to reflect civil rights leaders’
calls for a racial justice approach to the Department’s work. 207
Third, such an interpretive rule could be done without notice and
comment, expediting implementation and adding transparency without delay. Of course, the Department would probably solicit comments regarding a proposed interpretive rule. 208 But comments
would not legally bind the Department in the same manner as they
would for a legislative rule. And the Department could still use a comment process to engage researchers and civil rights organizations that
have already documented the links between whole child approaches
and improved student outcomes, and to reflect such links on the record.
B. APPLYING AN INTERPRETIVE RULE FOR WAIVER AUTHORITY

While not exhaustive, the following examples show how an interpretive rule that defines “advancing student achievement” and any
other waiver requirements could advance federal education priorities.
1. Testing and Accountability

An interpretive rule could provide clarity on how the Secretary
plans to evaluate requests to waive annual testing. Even as the Biden
Administration urges schools to return to in-person instruction, it is
still likely to face waiver requests as schools continue to grapple with

204. See Elementary and Secondary Education Act § 8401(b)(4)(A), (B)–(C).
205. See Nicholas Bagley, The Procedure Fetish, 118 MICH. L. REV. 345, 363 (2019)
(“In short, proceduralism drains agency resources, introduces delay, and thwarts
agency action.”).
206. See Elementary and Secondary Education Act § 8401(b)(4)(A)(iii).
207. See King & Morial, supra note 20.
208. See, e.g., U.S. Dep’t of Educ., Proposed Priorities-American History and Civics
Education, 86 Fed. Reg. 20348 (Apr. 19, 2021), https://www.federalregister.gov/
documents/2021/04/19/2021-08068/proposed-priorities-american-history-and
-civics-education [https://perma.cc/2Q2D-WND5] (soliciting comments for priorities
for a civics grant program).
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the pandemic. 209 And such requests may intensify as the Delta variant
puts some school reopening plans into question. 210 Like last year,
states might ask to waive assessment requirements completely; ask
for targeted waivers that allow them to require only a sample of students to take an exam; test only certain grades; omit required “diagnostic reports” in areas of a subject like geometry, fractions, and so on;
or skip alignments between tests and state standards. 211
Here, an interpretive rule prioritizing whole child equity would
offer the administration a consistent framework for granting or denying waivers. For instance, an interpretive rule could prompt states to
show in their waiver applications how schools will focus on efforts like
parent outreach and students’ social-emotional health. If the administration wants to urge states to implement assessments without formal accountability (as Secretary Cardona had supported and some
civil rights groups had urged), an interpretive rule could enable the
Administration to do so in order to document disparities caused by
the pandemic. 212 If the administration wants to support targeted
waivers, an interpretive rule could justify more labor-intensive approaches.
In the long term, an interpretive rule could address President
Biden’s concerns about testing. For instance, the Secretary could devise waivers and guidance that let states adjust how they use assessment results, or that show states how to incorporate performance

209. See Ujifusa, supra note 71.
210. See Katie Reilly, Schools Expected to Leave Virtual Learning Behind in the Fall,
but the Delta Variant Is Forcing a Change in Plans, TIME (Aug. 5, 2021, 2:43 PM),
https://time.com/6087815/covid-delta-schools-reopening [https://perma.cc/6GBH
-N9JY].
211. See Stephen Sawchuk, Could Biden Find a Middle Path on Student Testing During the Pandemic?, EDUC. WEEK (Dec. 1, 2020), https://www.edweek.org/policy
-politics/could-biden-find-a-middle-path-on-student-testing-during-the-pandemic/
2020/12 [https://perma.cc/5YX4-LSHR].
212. See Barnum, supra note 19 (citing Letter from Ajit Gopalakrishnan to Connecticut superintendents (Oct. 15, 2020)), https://cdn.vox-cdn.com/uploads/chorus_
asset/file/22194128/Connecticut_Student_Assessment_Guidance_for_2021.pdf
[https://perma.cc/2GGD-DMJR]); Kalyn Belsha, Teachers Unions Will Have Newfound
Influence In a Biden Administration. Here’s How They Might Use It, CHALKBEAT (Nov. 17,
2020, 10:50 AM), https://www.chalkbeat.org/2020/11/17/21571346/teachers
-unions-influence-biden-administration [https://perma.cc/8ZLZ-GMHW].
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assessments 213 or other alternative approaches. 214 An interpretive
rule would underscore the value that fewer, better tests may have for
building a complete picture of a child’s academic achievement, and
that revised approaches to testing may balance accountability. And an
interpretive rule might even provide a rationale for granting a waiver
on the condition that a school show how it is redirecting its resources
toward student support and enrichment activities.

2. State Plan Amendments

Although an interpretive rule for waivers would not affect state
education plans, a rule would signal what states should consider for
future plan amendments. Under the Every Student Succeeds Act,
every state must submit a plan to the U.S. Department of Education
showing how the state will implement the Act’s programs. 215 States
began implementing their plans in the 2017–18 school year. 216 A state
seeking to make significant changes to its Every Student Succeeds Act
plan—including to its academic standards, academic assessments, or
accountability system—must submit a state plan amendment. 217
These amendments are not subject to the waiver process. But an interpretive rule focused on ensuring whole child equity would serve as
a signal. The Biden Administration could point to such a rule to show
that, regardless of whether a state chooses to seek a waiver or submit
a state plan amendment, states need to prioritize whole child equity
in their use of ESEA funds.
With reauthorization of the Every Student Succeeds Act unlikely
to happen soon, the Biden Administration might rally states to submit
213. ANNA MAIER ET AL., LEARNING POL’Y INST., USING PERFORMANCE ASSESSMENTS TO
SUPPORT STUDENT LEARNING (2020), https://learningpolicyinstitute.org/product/cpac
-performance-assessments-support-student-learning-report
[https://perma.cc/
MK4V-E48A].
214. David A. DeSchryver, Biden’s Regulatory Agenda on Education, EDUC. NEXT
(Oct. 30, 2020), https://www.educationnext.org/bidens-regulatory-agenda-on
-education [https://perma.cc/6AGZ-JG92].
215. Elementary and Secondary Education Act § 8302(a)(1); see also ESEA Consolidated State Plans, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., https://oese.ed.gov/offices/office-of-formula
-grants/school-support-and-accountability/essa-consolidated-state-plans/ [https://
perma.cc/5YT9-75P5] (last visited Sept. 2, 2021) (“The purpose of the consolidated
State plan is to provide parents with quality, transparent information about how the
ESEA, as amended by the ESSA, will be implemented in their State.”).
216. BELLWETHER EDUCATION PARTNERS, AN INDEPENDENT REVIEW OF ESSA STATE
PLANS: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 1 (2017), https://bellwethereducation.org/sites/
default/files/Bellwether_ESSAReview_ExecSumm_1217_Final.pdf
[https://perma
.cc/V7RT-95Q4].
217. Elementary and Secondary Education Act § 1111(a)(6).
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amendments to their Every Student Succeeds Act plans. Indeed, as the
pandemic continues, states might seek state plan amendments that
scale back federally required accountability efforts. 218 What the Secretary will or will not waive, therefore, provides an important consideration for a state considering a plan amendment—and might even
steer states toward applying research-based recommendations for
supporting student health and wellness. 219
3. Additional Priorities

With the added transparency of an interpretive rule, the Biden
Administration could come to members of Congress and ask for appropriations or statutory fixes by showing how it will evaluate requests for waivers in those programs. For instance, the administration
could seek increased flexibility in the following areas:
• Charter schools: Offer to waive—or to refrain from waiving—
certain requirements of the federal Charter Schools Program in
exchange for a ban on for-profit charter schools. 220
• Student Support and Academic Enrichment Grants: Seek the
authority to waive or adjust the restrictions on technology purchasing, allowing for more money to be spent on providing devices to students and educators; identify provisions that could be
reinterpreted or waived to promote access to Positive Behavioral
Interventions and Supports, restorative justice, or other social
and emotional learning initiatives. 221
• Flexibility for equitable per pupil funding: Section 1501 of the
ESEA offers local educational agencies the flexibility to consolidate federal, state, and local funds based on weights that allocate
more funding to English learners, economically disadvantaged
students, or other student groups a local educational agency
chooses. 222 In districts with large intradistrict funding disparities, the Secretary could explore how to offer waivers in ways
that would encourage them to participate—and, ideally, to direct

218. See Ujifusa, supra note 71.
219. See HEALTHY SCHOOLS CAMPAIGN & ALLIANCE FOR A HEALTHIER GENERATION, STATE
ESSA PLANS TO SUPPORT STUDENT HEALTH AND WELLNESS: A FRAMEWORK FOR ACTION
(2017), https://healthyschoolscampaign.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/ESSA
-State-Framework.pdf [https://perma.cc/42M8-WFGF].
220. For more information on the federal Charter Schools Program, see SKINNER,
supra note 2, at 15.
221. For more information on Student Support and Academic Enrichment Grants,
see SKINNER, supra note 2, at 14.
222. Elementary and Secondary Education Act § 1501.
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additional funds toward their highest-needs students that provide whole-child supports.
• Desegregation: The Secretary could task the Department’s general counsel to identify additional provisions of the Act where
waivers could facilitate school integration activities or equitable
school funding.
Admittedly, many changes the Biden Administration seeks would
require congressional appropriations or statutory fixes. A waiver on
accountability requirements may not, say, induce a state to spend
more on school construction or teacher salaries. But an interpretive
rule on waivers could move educational equity forward while the administration focuses public attention and political capital on its legislative efforts, or if the Administration faces a Republican-controlled
Congress. And a rule could raise flexibilities to explore in the next
reauthorization of the Act.
CONCLUSION

Waivers help an agency respond to changing conditions, increase
agency flexibility, and advance executive policy priorities. The words
of section 8401 have changed relatively little. Courts have continued
to support discretion in education and elsewhere. And the doctrinal
and practical arguments for discretion within limits will only continue
to grow in the face of a more complex national education landscape.
By pursuing an interpretive rule and applying it to pressing Biden Administration priorities, the Secretary of Education can take advantage
of an often-overlooked tool to move education forward for our nation’s students.

